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Abstract: Authoritarianism has been predominantly utilized in American politics as a predictor of
Republican identification and conservative policy preferences. We argue that this approach has
neglected the role authoritarianism plays among Democrats and how it can operate within
political parties regardless of their ideological orientation. Drawing from three distinct sets of
data, we demonstrate the impact of authoritarianism in the 2016 Democratic Party’s primaries.
Authoritarianism consistently predicts differences in primary voting among Democrats,
particularly support for Hillary Clinton over Bernie Sanders. This effect is robust across various
model specifications including controls for ideology, partisan strength, and other predispositions.
These results highlight the potential of authoritarianism to shape leadership preferences within
the Democratic Party. We advocate for a reconsideration of authoritarianism as a disposition
with meaningful consequences for intraparty dynamics and conclude with practical implications
regarding the future of the Democratic Party.
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Although the 2016 election brought authoritarianism into mainstream American political
discourse (MacWilliams 2016), the dominant narrative focused almost exclusively on
Republicans who consistently fall on the high end of the authoritarianism scale (Federico and
Tagar 2014; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). While it is true that high authoritarians have sorted
en masse into the Republican Party, it is a misconception that authoritarianism has little to no
significance within the Democratic Party. Though Republicans tend to exhibit higher levels of
authoritarianism than Democrats, there is substantial variation in authoritarianism among
Democrats. We argue that disregarding these intraparty divisions provides an incomplete
account of authoritarianism’s role in the current political landscape.
This research note addresses these concerns by demonstrating that authoritarianism not
only exists within the Democratic Party, but exerted strong and divisive effects on voting
preferences within the 2016 primary between relatively moderate, establishment candidate
Hillary Clinton and progressive, populist candidate Bernie Sanders. Specifically, high
authoritarian Democrats supported Clinton while low authoritarian Democrats supported
Sanders. We speculate that this authoritarian divide will further complicate the Democratic
leadership’s attempts to unify their party’s base in future elections.
Authoritarianism and the Democratic Party
Authoritarianism reflects a spectrum of psychological group orientations ranging from
individual autonomy to social conformity (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner
2005), where high authoritarians possess dispositional needs for order, certainty, and security,
and adherence to conventional, established institutions (Jost et al. 2003; Hetherington and Weiler
2009). Accordingly, authoritarian dispositions provide a functional link to ideological
conservatism (Federico and Tagar 2014), right-wing policy preferences (Johnston and Wronski
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2015; Hetherington and Suhay 2011), and traditionalism (Federico, Fisher, and Deason 2011).
Yet the construct of authoritarianism also contains group-centric components, which
motivate authoritarians to structure their group in ways that, “…enhance sameness and minimize
diversity of people, beliefs, and behaviors” (Stenner 2005: 16). From this perspective,
authoritarians aim to protect the group's cohesion from members and leaders who do not comply
with the group’s values and norms. Importantly, this component of authoritarianism is grounded
in the desire to be part of a group, not in identification with a particular social or political group
(Duckitt 1989; Stellmacher and Petzel 2005). Taking these conceptualizations together,
authoritarians should be more committed to their political party (per Luttig 2017), and support
leaders that are more conventional or prototypical of the group (Hogg 2001).
The 2016 Democratic primary election provides an excellent context of intra-party
competition within which to examine the effects of authoritarianism on vote choice. On one
hand, Clinton was a traditional candidate, being relatively hawkish and religious, and a group
exemplar with a decades-long career in the party. On the other hand, Sanders was a nontraditional, party outsider who adopted the Democratic label more recently and distinguished
himself as a “democratic socialist.” Authoritarianism could, therefore, shape Democratic primary
vote choice on the basis of its association with traditionalism (Federico, Fisher and Deason 2011;
Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and its latent motive to preserve group uniformity and support
more prototypical group leaders (Stenner 2005; Stellmacher and Petzel 2005; Hogg 2001). We
thus predict an authoritarian divide among Democrats in the 2016 primary elections, with high
authoritarians gravitating towards Clinton and low authoritarians towards Sanders.
Data and Methods
To test the effects of authoritarianism among Democrats, we utilized data from two
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nationally diverse sources: the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)
University of Mississippi module (Dowling 2016), and a YouGov study fielded Fall 2017
(N=1000 each, see Table A1). We also used a nonprobability sample of undergraduates from five
Southern universities, comprised predominantly of first-time voters (N=955, see Table A1). The
student sample provides a test of our hypothesis among individuals whose political ideology and
partisan loyalties are still malleable (Campbell et al. 1960), while their dispositional traits, like
authoritarianism, are relatively stable and exogenous to political socialization (McCourt et al.
1999). Thus, although the student sample is non-representative, it allows us to examine to what
extent authoritarianism among young Democrats is already a predictive force of their voting
behavior and how its effect compares to their developing political preferences such as
partisanship and ideology. Since we are primarily interested in divisions within the Democratic
Party, our full models only include Democrats who voted for either Clinton or Sanders in the
2016 primary1 (N=295 CCES, N=217 YouGov, and N=163 student sample).
All datasets contained the child-rearing measure of authoritarianism (Feldman 2003),
coded 0-1, with higher values reflecting greater authoritarianism. This scale relates directly to the
aggression and submission components of authoritarianism (see Feldman and Stenner 1997;
Stenner 2005), and is highly correlated with conventionalism and Altemeyer's (1988) RightWing Authoritarianism scale (see Feldman 2003). Of particular relevance, this child-rearing
scale is the standard measure of authoritarianism used in contemporary American politics
research (see Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and in examining vote choice in the 2016 election
(MacWilliams 2016). Though some scholars argue that this scale assesses authoritarianism
1"

Democratic primary voters not voting for Clinton or Sanders either voted for a Republican

(student sample: N=10, CCES: N=18), or did not recall who they voted for (YouGov: N=6).
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differentially across race (Pérez and Hetherington 2014), our analyses combine Whites and nonWhites in order to properly reflect the ethnic and racial diversity of Democratic voters (though
our key results generally hold when examining Whites and non-Whites separately despite
reduced sample size, see Figure A4, Table A7a & A7b).
The distribution of authoritarianism in our primary national dataset, the CCES (see
Figure 1a), confirms that Republicans (N=341, mean=0.62) are significantly more authoritarian
than Democrats (N=461, mean=0.48, t=-6.4, p<0.001 in an independent t-test with unequal
variances). Concurrently, however, the variation in authoritarianism is significantly higher
among Democrats than Republicans (standard deviations of 0.35 and 0.30 respectively, F=1.39,
p<0.0012, in a standard variance comparison test). Notably, the difference between Clinton and
Sanders supporters (N=187, mean=0.52, and N=108, mean=0.29, respectively, t = 5.66, p<0.001)
is larger than the difference between Republicans and Democrats (0.23 versus 0.14 respectively,
see Figure 1b). We replicate this pattern of variation in our other national sample (YouGov),
while the student sample reveals equal variances in authoritarianism across parties (Figures A1aA2b). There is no similar divide among Republicans between Trump and Cruz primary voters in
any of our samples (Figure A3a-A3c). Thus, the intraparty distribution of authoritarianism is
largely unique to the Democratic Party.
Figures 1a and 1b: Distributions of Authoritarianism (CCES)

Note: Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles indicate mean values for each group.
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Our dependent variable is the dichotomous primary vote choice between Sanders (0) and
Clinton (1). We control for self-reported ideology and partisan strength in order to examine the
effects of authoritarianism independent of these relevant factors. In the YouGov study, we
account for the possibility that alternative individual difference variables, including social
dominance orientation (SDO), need for cognitive closure, and racial resentment, could shape
vote choice. Last, in all three samples, we include controls for education, church attendance,
gender, and race, while the CCES and the YouGov sample add controls for income, union
membership, Southern residence, and marital status2.
Predicting 2016 Democratic Primary Vote Choice
We first logistically regress vote choice for Clinton versus Sanders on authoritarianism
and our aforementioned control variables3 (Figure 2 & Table A3, see also Tables A4-A6 for
robustness checks). In line with our expectations, authoritarianism is a significant and positive
predictor of voting for Clinton over Sanders in all samples. In the CCES and YouGov samples,
partisan strength is also a positive predictor of voting for Clinton. However, it was not a
significant determinant in the undergraduate sample, demonstrating the primacy of authoritarian
dispositions in shaping young people’s political preferences. Similarly, ideology is only a
significant predictor of voting for Clinton over Sanders in the YouGov sample, indicating that
authoritarianism operates above and beyond ideological identification and partisan strength.
Finally, we find that authoritarianism is the only significant predispositional measure, suggesting
2"

These variables are dropped in the student models given their lack of variation. See Table A2

for all variable descriptions.
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Addition of the controls reduces the CCES sample to N=260, the YouGov sample to N=195,

and the student sample to N=101 in the presented models.
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that this candidate match-up specifically resonates with Democrats' authoritarian dispositions.
Figure 2: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders

Note: Plots show coefficients from logistic regression models. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov,
and the 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age,
which is measured in decades (see Table A2 for variable details).

The predicted probabilities displayed in Figure 3 clearly illustrate the effects of
authoritarianism on Democratic vote choice in all three data sets. As a Democrat in the CCES
sample moves from the minimum value on the authoritarianism scale to the maximum value, the
probability of voting for Clinton increases from 0.33 to 0.76 while holding other influential
factors constant. Similarly, the probability of voting for Clinton rises from 0.36 to 0.71 across the
range of authoritarianism in the YouGov sample, closely mirroring the results from the CCES.
Among students, the effect is even larger – the probability of voting for Clinton increases
dramatically from 0.18 to 0.867 as young Democrats shift from the lower end of authoritarianism
to its maximum value.
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Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities based on Logistic Regression Results

Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated holding all variables at their mean or modal categories (see Table A1).

These results provide evidence for an authoritarian divide among Democrats that played a
crucial role in the 2016 primary. Importantly, these effects are driven by respondents at both the
low and high ends of authoritarianism. Surprisingly, we do not find any significant effect of
authoritarianism among Republicans’ primary vote choice in all three samples (see Figure A5 &
Table A8), which underlines the uniquely divisive nature of authoritarianism among Democrats.
Moreover, as we have shown by replicating our results with a student sample, this authoritarian
divide is already discernable among young Democrats whose party loyalties and ideological
preferences are not yet solidified. This emphasizes the importance of authoritarianism, even
among first-time voters.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that authoritarianism 1) exists within the Democratic Party, where
variation on this disposition abounds, 2) imparts differential effects on vote choice, highlighting
intraparty conflicts, and 3) predicts political preferences, even among youth, for whom partisan
strength and ideology are less stable factors. In 2016, Clinton was the more traditional candidate,
7"

with a long history as a brand name party figure who had taken on various leadership roles –
characteristics which should appeal to authoritarian Democrats. In contrast, Sanders was an
Independent turned Democrat, who promoted an aggressively liberal agenda with an
unambiguous disdain for the party establishment, all of which authoritarians should eschew.
While we discuss traditionalism and group-centric aspects of authoritarianism, the causal
mechanism by which this trait affected Democrats’ vote choice remains unclear in the present
data. Future research should assess how these aspects of authoritarianism shape electoral
behavior among voters in both parties.
Where do Democrats go from here? Our results suggest that the party should be
cognizant of the potentially conflicting leadership preferences of their base. Indeed, within
months of Trump’s victory, the election for Democratic National Committee Chair again divided
the party into Sanders and Clinton factions. The newly formed Justice Democrats Political
Action Committee has called for the ousting of establishment incumbents, and has endorsed
dozens of Sanders-style candidates for the 2018 primaries. All of these events are indicative of
intraparty battles that could continue dividing Democrats along the authoritarian dimension.
Such disputes over the party’s brand have the potential to weaken party attachments and political
engagement among Democrats (Huddy, Mason and Aarøe 2015). Notably, such divisions were
not found in Republican primary voting patterns, highlighting an important partisan asymmetry
(per Federico, Deason and Fisher 2012). We hope that our findings motivate further research on
authoritarianism among Democrats and how this disposition affects the party’s future leadership.
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Appendix
Table A1: Sample Characteristics for Democrat Primary Voting Respondents
Authoritarianism
PID Strength
Ideology
Church Attendance
Gender
Race
Education
Income
Union Membership
Martial Status
Age
Southern Residence
Need for Closure
Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO)
Symbolic Racism/
Racial Resentment
Democratic Primary
Vote Choice
N

CCES Sample
0.44
0.74
0.30
0.36
54% Female
67% White
0.63
0.34
33% Union
48% Married
5.1
30% live in the South
---

YouGov Sample
0.41
0.74
0.29
0.27
60% Female
64% White
0.54
0.27
30% Union
46% Married
5.3
26% live in the South
0.61
0.18

Student Sample
0.28
0.67
0.20
0.42
54% Female
65% White
---------

0.15

0.31

--

Clinton 63%,
Sanders 37%
295

Clinton 56%,
Sanders 44%
217

Clinton 28%,
Sanders 72%
163

Sample characteristics are calculated for Democrats who voted for either Clinton or Sanders in the 2016
primary. We provide sample characteristics for this subset of respondents, rather than the full sample,
because these are the respondents used in the key analyses presented in Figures 1b, 2, and 3. For partisan
strength, ideology, church attendance, education, need for closure, SDO, and symbolic racism/racial
resentment we report mean values on a 0-1 scale. For age (in decades) and income, we report median values.
For gender, race, union membership, and martial status, we report the percentage of observations in the
specified category. See Table A2 for all item descriptions and coding.
Sample methodology: The 2016 CCES University of Mississippi module (N=1000) was administered by
YouGov/Polimetrix, and included the child-rearing authoritarianism scale in the pre-election wave of the
survey. The 2016 CCES pre-election wave common content supplied the dependent and control variables.
The YouGov survey (N=1000) was administered September 29-October 10, 2017, though 2016 primary vote
choice and other demographic variables were gathered as part of the YouGov/Polimetrix panel in 2016.
Thus, the Democratic primary vote choice variable in the CCES and YouGov samples reflect a similar recall
task. YouGov/Polimetrix matches respondents to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, education, party
identification, ideology, and political interest. This frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the
full 2010 American Community Survey with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements.
955 students across five public universities in the South participated in our survey the week prior to the 2016
general election either voluntarily or for course credit.

Table A2: Item Descriptions and Coding
Item Name
Authoritarianism

PID Strength
Ideology
Church Attendance
Gender
Race
Education
Income
Union Membership
Martial Status
Age
Southern Residence

Need for Closure

Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO)

Item Description
"Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children
should have, every person thinks that some are more important than
others. Please select which one you think is more important for a child to
have:"
1.!Independence or Respect for Elders
2.!Curiosity or Good Manners
3.!Self-Reliance or Obedience
4.!Being Considerate or Well-Behaved
All four items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values
represent greater levels of authoritarianism.
1=Strong Democrat/Republican, .5=Not so Strong Democrat/Republican,
0=Weak Democrat/Republican
5-point (CESS & YouGov) or 7-point (student sample) ideological selfplacement scale, recoded 0-1 from 0=Very Liberal to 1=Very
Conservative
6-point scale, recoded 0-1 to range from 0=Never Attend to 1=Attend
more than once a week
1=Female, 0=Male
1=White, 0=non-White
6-point self-placement scale of highest level of education, recoded 0-1
from 0=No High School to 1=Post-Graduate Degree
16-category family income self-report item, recoded 0-1 from 0=Less
than $10,000 to 1=$500,000 or More
1=Previously or currently belong to a union, 0=Never belonged to a union
1=Married, 0=Otherwise
Years old in decades
1=Lives in the South (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, and West Virginia), 0=Otherwise
"For the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or
disagreement with each statement."
1.!I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
2.!I dislike unpredictable or uncertain situations.
3.!I dislike questions that could be answered in many different ways.
Each item includes the following 4 response options: Strongly Agree,
Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. All three
items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values represent
greater need for cognitive closure.
"Please respond to the following statements by indicating the extent to
which you agree or disagree with them. Choose the response from the
rating scale that best represents your evaluation of the item."
1.!Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
2.!If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
3.!Group equality should be our ideal.
4.!We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
Each item includes the following 6 response options: Strongly Agree,

Racial Resentment
(YouGov sample)

Symbolic Racism
(CCES sample)

Democratic Primary
Vote Choice

Moderately Agree, Slightly Agree, Slightly Disagree, Moderately
Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. All four items are scaled together, and
coded 0-1 such that higher values represent greater SDO.
"Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of
the following statements."
1.!Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice
and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special
favors.
2.!It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks
would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.
3.!Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that
make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
4.!Most blacks who don't get ahead should not blame the system; they
only have themselves to blame.
Each item includes the following 4 response options: Strongly Agree,
Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. All four
items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values represent
greater racial resentment.
"Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?"
1.!I am angry that racism exists.
2.!White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color
of their skin.
3.!Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.
Each item includes the following 6 response options: Strongly Agree,
Agree, Agree Slightly, Disagree Slightly, Disagree, and Strongly
Disagree. All three items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that
higher values represent greater symbolic racism.
In the CCES sample, respondents were first asked if they voted in any
2016 primary, while in the YouGov sample they were first asked if they
voted in the 2016 Democratic primary. In both studies, those that
answered "yes" to this item received a follow-up question asking who
they voted for. Options in the CCES included: Hillary Clinton, Bernie
Sanders, Another Democrat, Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, John Kasich,
Marco Rubio, Another Republican, and Someone else who is not a
Democrat or Republican. Options in the YouGov study included: Hillary
Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Someone Else, and Don't Recall.
In the student sample, respondents were asked: "Who did you vote for in
your state's presidential primary?" Response options included: Hillary
Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, Other,
and Didn't Vote in Primary.
For each sample, the variable of Democratic primary vote choice is
constructed such that those who said they voted for Bernie Sanders were
coded 0, and those voting for Hillary Clinton were coded 1. The few
primary voting respondents who did not choose either of these
Democratic primary candidates either voted for a Republican, or could
not recall who they voted for. We treat these other responses as noise, and
are coded as blank.

Figures A1a & A1b: Distributions of Authoritarianism (YouGov)

Note: Data come from the 2017 YouGov study. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open
circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a
significant difference in authoritarianism between Democrats (N=358, mean=0.47) and Republicans
(N=233, mean = 0.61, t= 4.82, p < 0.001). In a variance comparison test, we also find that Democrats
(st.dev. = 0.37) exhibit significantly higher variation in authoritarianism than Republicans (st.dev = 0.31, F
= 0.69, p < 0.01). In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a significant difference in
authoritarianism between Democrats who supported Hillary Clinton (N = 112, mean = 0.54) and Democrats
who supported Bernie Sanders (N = 72, mean = 0.29, t = 4.96, p < 0.001).

Figures A2a & A2b: Distributions of Authoritarianism (Students)

Note: Data come from the 2016 student sample. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open
circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a
significant difference in authoritarianism between Democrats (N=349, mean=0.30) and Republicans
(N=405, mean = 0.52, t= 10.23, p < 0.001). In a variance comparison test, we find no significant difference
in the variation in authoritarianism between Democrats (st.dev. = 0.28) and Republicans (st.dev.
= 0.30, F = 1.14, p < 0.18). In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a significant difference
in authoritarianism between Democrats who supported Hillary Clinton (N = 43, mean = 0.40) and
Democrats who supported Bernie Sanders (N = 113, mean = 0.22, t = -3.20, p < 0.01).

Figure A3a: Distribution of Authoritarianism among Republicans by Primary Vote
Choice (CCES)

Note: Data come from the 2016 CCES. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles
indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find no significant
difference in authoritarianism between Republicans who supported Donald Trump (N=125, mean = 0.66)
and Republicans who supported Ted Cruz (N=44, mean = 0.61) in the 2016 primary elections (t = 0.94, p
< 0.35).

Figure A3b: Distribution of Authoritarianism among Republicans by Primary Vote
Choice (YouGov)

Note: Data come from the 2017 YouGov. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles
indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find no significant
difference in authoritarianism between Republicans who supported Donald Trump (N= 69, mean = 0.64)
and Republicans who supported Ted Cruz (N=34, mean = 0.58, t= -0.93, p< 0.36).

Figure A3c: Distribution of Authoritarianism among Republicans by Primary Vote
Choice (Students)

Note: Data come from the 2016 student sample. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open
circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find no
significant difference in authoritarianism between Republicans who supported Donald Trump (N= 73, mean
= 0.54) and Republicans who supported Ted Cruz (N=44, mean = 0.59, t= -0.86, p< 0.39).

Table A3: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders (corresponding
with Figure 2)
Authoritarianism
PID Strength
Ideology
Church Attendance
Gender
Race
Education
Income
Union Membership
Marital Status
Age
South
Need for Closure
SDO
Racial Resentment
Constant
Pseudo R2
N

CCES
1.88 (0.50)
1.01 (0.42)
1.14 (0.76)
0.22 (0.50)
-0.30 (0.32)
-0.51 (0.37)
-0.52 (0.58)
3.16 (0.94)
-0.23 (0.31)
-0.24 (0.35)
0.21 (0.09)
0.43 (0.33)
-2.60 (0.80)
0.19
260

YouGov
1.47 (0.57)
1.56 (0.49)
2.74 (0.92)
0.48 (0.83)
-0.54 (0.39)
-0.70 (0.47)
0.01 (0.67)
1.11 (1.03)
-1.04 (0.39)
0.28 (0.42)
0.14 (0.13)
0.34 (0.44)
-0.54 (1.07)
-1.57 (1.27)
0.39 (0.86)
-1.97 (1.10)
0.23
195

Students
3.36 (1.12)
0.49 (0.67)
-1.03 (1.92)
0.65 (0.86)
-0.01 (0.49)
0.93 (0.56)
-2.80 (0.97)
0.15
101

Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and
1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES,
2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0
to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at p< 0.05.

Table A4: Heckman Probit Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders
Authoritarianism
PID Strength
Ideology
Church Attendance
Gender
Race
Education
Income
Union Membership
Marital Status
Age
South
Need for Closure
SDO
Racial Resentment
Constant

CCES
0.76 (0.22)
-0.06 (0.19)
0.63 (0.30)
0.12 (0.22)
-0.09 (0.15)
-0.40 (0.16)
-0.31 (0.25)
1.56 (0.41)
-0.11 (0.13)
-0.12 (0.14)
0.07 (0.04)+
0.16 (0.15)
-0.07 (0.34)

YouGov
0.55 (0.24)
0.30 (0.20)
1.04 (0.33)
0.38 (0.28)
-0.13 (0.16)
-0.26 (0.19)
0.01 (0.26)
0.48 (0.39)
-0.48 (0.16)
0.04 (0.16)
-0.04 (0.05)
0.14 (0.14)
-0.35 (0.40)
-0.71 (0.47)
0.13 (0.26)
0.72 (0.41)+

Students
1.91 (1.09)+
0.47 (2.03)
-0.39 (0.94)
0.35 (0.52)
-0.05 (0.48)
0.56 (0.41)
-2.03 (3.56)

Selection
PID Strength
Age
Gender
Race
Constant
N
Censored N
Uncensored N

0.90 (0.16)
0.07 (0.04)+
-0.24 (0.13)+
0.33 (0.13)
-0.72 (0.22)
427
167
260

0.48 (0.16)
0.14 (0.04)
-0.05 (0.13)
-0.03 (0.13)
-1.01 (0.22)
423
228
195

1.02 (0.19)
-0.20 (0.16)
0.01 (0.15)
-0.96 (0.19)
340
239
101

Note: Estimates were obtained using a Heckman probit model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and 1
indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES,
2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. PID strength, age, gender, and race were used as selection variables
for the models relying on the CCES and YouGov data, whereas the student sample model relies on PID
strength, gender, and race. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except
for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at p< 0.05, and + when p<.10.

Table A5: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders Excluding
Partisan Strength and Ideology
Authoritarianism
Church Attendance
Gender
Race
Education
Income
Union Membership
Marital Status
Age
South
Need for Closure
SDO
Racial Resentment
Constant
Pseudo R2
N

CCES
2.05 (0.49)
0.54 (0.48)
-0.14 (0.31)
-0.58 (0.36)
-0.76 (0.58)
3.02 (0.91)
-0.18 (0.30)
-0.09 (0.34)
0.21 (0.08)
0.44 (0.33)
-1.63 (0.70)
0.16
262

YouGov
2.13 (0.50)
0.95 (0.64)
-0.29 (0.32)
-0.54 (0.37)
-0.06 (0.60)
-0.01 (0.89)
-0.66 (0.34)+
0.31 (0.35)
0.20 (0.11)+
-0.12 (0.35)
0.20 (0.85)
-1.21 (1.03)
-0.34 (0.77)
-1.12 (0.92)
0.15
220

Students
3.07 (0.92)
0.56 (0.84)
-0.12 (0.48)
1.01 (0.56)+
-2.53 (0.76)
0.13
101

Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and
1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES,
2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0
to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at p< 0.05, and +
when p<.10.
In the CCES and YouGov samples, the coefficients for authoritarianism are larger when not controlling for
respondents' partisan strength and ideology, suggesting that a portion of authoritarianism's effect on
Democratic primary vote choice may be mediated through individuals' partisan strength and ideological
self-identification. However, as seen in Figure 2 and Table A3, authoritarianism is still a significant
predictor of vote choice even when holding partisan strength and ideology constant, meaning that
authoritarianism operates above and beyond its association with increased party attachment (see Luttig
2017) and ideological conservatism (see Federico et al. 2011). Interestingly, the coefficient for
authoritarianism in the student sample is smaller when not controlling for partisan strength and ideology,
indicating that any mediation of authoritarianism through partisanship and ideology has not occurred yet
among these younger voters.

Table A6: Two Additional Robustness Models – Logistic Regression Results Voting for
Clinton over Sanders Including Symbolic Racism (CCES) & Excluding Church
Attendance (Students)
Authoritarianism
PID Strength
Ideology
Church Attendance
Gender
Race
Education
Income
Union Membership
Marital Status
Age
South
Symbolic Racism
Constant
Pseudo R2
N

CCES
2.00 (0.60)
0.84 (0.45)+
1.89 (0.90)
-0.54 (0.57)
-0.25 (0.35)
-0.77 (0.42)+
-0.56 (0.67)
3.46 (1.18)
-0.41 (0.34)
-0.25 (0.41)
0.27 (0.10)
0.36 (0.36)
-0.33 (1.16)
-2.50 (0.93)
0.18
208

Students
2.30 (0.77)
0.91 (0.56)
0.77 (1.37)
0.26 (0.39)
0.52 (0.44)
-2.94 (0.71)
0.08
154

Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and
1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES,
and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for
age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at p< 0.05, and + when p<.10.
We find that when holding racial attitudes constant in the CCES sample, authoritarianism is still a significant
predictor of voting for Clinton over Sanders. Further, symbolic racism has no bearing on Democratic
primary vote choice.
Since not all of the universities participating in the student sample asked about church attendance (dropping
N=53 respondents from the model shown in Figure 2), we wanted to ensure that the effect of authoritarianism
on Democratic vote choice held even when including those respondents – which it does.

Figure A4: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders (Whites v. NonWhites)

Note: Plots show coefficients from logistic regression models distinguishing between White and non-White
respondents. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate
comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades.

Table A7a: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders (Whites)
CCES
YouGov
Students
Authoritarianism
2.14 (0.64)
1.90 (0.88)
2.71 (1.19)
PID Strength
0.69 (0.49)
0.52 (0.97)
2.38 (0.63)
Ideology
1.72 (0.99)+
6.30 (3.41)+
2.47 (1.26)
Church Attendance
0.07 (0.62)
1.11 (1.11)
-0.15 (1.07)
Gender
-0.28 (0.38)
-0.33 (0.56)
0.32 (0.68)
Education
-0.57 (0.73)
-0.66 (0.85)
Income
2.72 (1.47)+
3.47 (1.10)
Union Membership
-0.41 (0.38)
-1.18 (0.55)
Marital Status
-0.11 (0.42)
-0.42 (0.58)
Age
0.27
(0.15)+
0.30 (0.11)
South
0.71 (0.42)+
0.27 (0.60)
Need for Closure
-2.35 (1.50)
SDO
-4.76 (2.26)
Racial Resentment
0.97 (1.24)
Constant
-2.63 (1.39)+
-3.67 (0.96)
-2.97 (1.26)
2
Pseudo R
0.21
0.29
0.17
173
125
59
Table A7b: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders (Non-Whites)
CCES
YouGov
Students
Authoritarianism
0.70 (0.91)
2.36 (1.30)+
6.03 (1.90)
PID Strength
2.70 (1.16)
-0.44 (1.32)
2.10 (1.85)
Ideology
0.56 (1.42)
2.90 (2.40)
-5.26 (3.14)+
Church Attendance
0.92 (0.96)
0.13 (1.27)
2.02 (2.54)
Gender
-0.69 (0.67)
-2.04 (1.10)+
0.28(1.09)
Education
-0.03 (1.22)
3.10 (1.65)+
Income
3.21 (2.33)
-3.01 (1.88)
Union Membership
-0.18 (0.66)
-0.51 (0.88)
Marital Status
-1.10 (0.92)
2.14 (0.98)
Age
0.07 (0.17)
-0.12 (0.29)
South
0.10 (0.64)
0.93 (0.96)
Need for Closure
6.95 (3.12)
SDO
0.46 (2.54)
Racial Resentment
3.53 (1.90)+
Constant
-2.50 (1.68)
-5.02 (3.02)+
-5.47 (2.42)
Pseudo R2
0.17
0.39
0.39
87
70
42
Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and
1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES,
2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0
to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at p< 0.05, and +
when p<.10. In the non-Whites models, the non-significant authoritarianism coefficient may be the result of
insufficient N, or the nature of the child-rearing authoritarianism measure "behaving" differently for nonWhites (see Perez & Hetherington 2014). In all models the authoritarianism coefficient is still in the direction
of predicting vote choice for Clinton over Sanders.

Figure A5: Logistic Regression Results Among Republicans Voting for Cruz over Trump

Note: Plots show coefficients from logistic regression models. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017
YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1,
except for age, which is measured in decades. Sample is restricted to Republican identifiers who voted for
either Trump or Cruz in the 2016 Republican primary.

Table A8: Logistic Regression Results Among Republicans Voting for Cruz over Trump
CCES
YouGov
Students
Authoritarianism
-0.63 (0.91)
-1.18 (0.78)
1.34 (0.93)
PID Strength
0.06 (0.62)
0.26 (0.56)
-1.35 (1.23)
Ideology
-0.07 (2.03)
3.98 (1.09)
4.46 (1.37)
Church Attendance
0.65 (0.65)
0.79 (0.77)
1.23 (1.08)
Gender
0.15 (0.49)
0.36 (0.57)
-1.00 (0.48)
Race
0.80 (0.69)
0.05 (0.67)
-1.05 (1.11)
Education
-1.08 (1.06)
1.92 (0.95)
Income
-0.92 (1.23)
1.40 (1.43)
Union Membership
0.81 (0.52)
0.03 (0.52)
Marital Status
0.24 (0.59)
0.14 (0.55)
Age
-0.11 (0.15)
-0.14 (0.16)
South
0.03 (0.44)
0.35 (0.51)
Need for Closure
0.48 (1.18)
SDO
0.60 (1.41)
Racial Resentment
-1.05 (1.26)
Constant
-2.88 (1.95)
-0.09 (1.99)
-5.45 (1.65)
Pseudo R2
0.14
0.15
0.07
N
145
119
76
Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Trump and
1 indicates voting for Cruz, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017
YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1,
except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at p< 0.05. Sample is
restricted to Republican identifiers who voted for either Trump or Cruz in the 2016 Republican primary.
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